

# SPARX: A Family of ARX-based Lightweight Block Ciphers with Provable Bounds

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<https://www.cryptolux.org>

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UNIVERSITÉ DU  
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(FELICS framework, block ciphers with key size at least 128 bits)

# Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Description of SPARX
- 3 Implementation
- 4 Conclusion



# Plan


- 1 Introduction
  - Block Ciphers
  - Design Strategies

2 Description of SPARX

3 Implementation


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## Block Ciphers




## Block Ciphers

- 1 Primitive: must be used in modes (authenticated encryption).




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
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





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- 4  $\Rightarrow$  BC is the weakest part.





## S-Box Based



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## ARX Based

### Pros.

- Lightweight implementations.
- Less vulnerable to side-channel attacks.

### Cons.

- Security hard to justify.

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Substitution-Permutation, ARX-Based  $\implies$  **SPARX**

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- 2 Description of SPARX
  - High Level View of SPARX
  - ARX-Boxes
  - Security Analysis
- 3 Implementation
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# High Level View


## SPARX family of block ciphers

- Designed using a long trail strategy (our contribution).
- 64 or 128 bit **block**, 128 or 256 bit **key**.
- Only 16-bit operations:  $\lll i, \oplus, \boxplus$ .

# ARX-Boxes

## SPECKEY

- 1 Start from SPECK-32
- 2 XOR key in full state (Markov assumption)
- 3 Find **best** trails



SPECKEY




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

## Parameter Search

- Rotations  $7, -2$
- Second best crypto properties, lightest
- NSA design strategy?




SPECKEY

# Notations







## SPARX-64/128




Step Function.

 $\mathcal{L}$ .

## SPARX-128/128 and SPARX-128/256



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# Security

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$n/k$	64/128	128/128	128/256
rounds attacked/total	15/24	22/32	24/40
security margin	38 %	31 %	40 %

“Attack” means recovering secret key faster than exhaustive search.



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  - Methodology
  - Results
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# Benchmarking

<https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/FELICS>

- Fair Evaluation of Lightweight Cryptographic Systems
- 8-bit ATMEL AVR ; 16-bit TI MSP ; 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3
- Usage scenarios (e.g. CBC encryption of 128 bytes)
- Extracts RAM usage, ROM usage, # CPU cycles.

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- Figure Of Merit aggregates: all metrics accross all platforms for the best implementations of one algorithm.

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Gray: designers did not provide differential/linear bounds.

# Flexibility of the Implementation

Implem.	Block size [bits]	AVR			MSP			ARM		
		Time [cyc.]	Code [B]	RAM [B]	Time [cyc.]	Code [B]	RAM [B]	Time [cyc.]	Code [B]	RAM [B]
1-step ro	64	1789	248	2	1088	166	14	1370	176	28
1-step un		1641	424	1	907	250	12	1100	348	24
2-steps ro		1677	356	2	1034	232	10	1331	304	28
2-steps un		1529	712	1	853	404	8	932	644	24
1-step ro	128	4553	504	11	2809	300	26	3463	348	44
1-step un		4165	1052	10	2353	584	24	2784	884	40
2-steps ro		4345	720	11	2593	432	18	3399	620	40
2-steps un		3957	1820	10	2157	1004	16	2377	1692	36

“ro”: rolled ; “un”: unrolled.

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  - Wrapping up!

# Conclusion (1/2)

The SPARX ciphers are:

- 1 lightweight and SCA-secure as ARX-based ciphers,
- 2 provably secure against some attacks as SPNs (**the first!**),
- 3 flexible: different implementation trade-offs are possible.



## Conclusion (2/2)

- Visit <https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/SPARX>
- Check <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/984>
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