

# Algorithmic toolkit for linearization of S-boxes

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PQseal (C24/IS/18978392) and CryptoFin (C22/IS/17415825)



## Definition

An affine map  $A : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$  is a vectorial  $g$ -approximation of  $S : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$  if

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## Definition (Vectorial linearity, Chen and Fu 2001)

$$\text{VecLin}_S = \max_{\text{aff. maps } A} \# \{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid S(x) = A(x)\}$$

Literature examples (linearize then solve algebraically):

- LowMC [Banik, Barooti, Durak, and Vaudenay 2020 ToSC]
- RAIN/AIMer [Zhang, Wang, Yu, Guo, and Cui 2023 ASIACRYPT]
- AES-like hashing (preimages) [Chen, Guo, List, Shi, and Zhang 2024 EUROCRYPT]

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- Keccak (preimages) [Qiao, Song, Liu, and Guo 2017 EUROCRYPT]

*note:* linearization on *subspaces*

- [Chen and Fu 2001]
- [Liu, Mesnager, and Chen 2017 CCDS]
- [Carlet 2021 TIT]
- [Ryabov 2023; Ryabov 2024a; Ryabov 2024b ]
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## Theoretical studies

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What are the **best** approximations for 8-bit crypto S-boxes?

Our algorithms

Results

Cryptanalysis techniques

Conclusions

## Our algorithms

Exhaustive reduction algorithm (LAT-based)


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
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# Reduction framework (LAT)




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
1. Start with  $X = \mathbb{F}_2^n$
2. For each output bit  $i = 0 \dots n - 1$ 
  - 2.1 Compute Walsh transform of  $S_i$  restricted to inputs  $X$
  - 2.2 Choose mask  $\alpha$  achieving largest absolute bias
  - 2.3 Reduce  $X$  to  $\{x \in X \mid \langle \alpha, x \rangle = S_i(x)\}$

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
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  - 2.3 Reduce  $X$  to  $\{x \in X \mid \langle \alpha, x \rangle = S_i(x)\}$
3. Interpolate  $A$  from  $A(x) = S(x)$  for all  $x \in X$

# Exhaustive reduction algorithm (LAT)

**Input:** lower bound  $B > 0$

1. Start with  $X = \mathbb{F}_2^n$
2. For each output bit  $i = 0 \dots n - 1$ 
  - 2.1 Compute Walsh transform of  $S_i$  restricted to inputs  $X$
  - 2.2 For every signed mask  $\alpha$ 
    - 2.2.1 Reduce  $X$  to  $\{x \in X \mid \langle \alpha, x \rangle = S_i(x)\}$
    - 2.2.2 If  $|X| \geq B$ , continue with other bits recursively. Otherwise, **abort**.

**Output:** all affine approximations of  $S$  of size at least  $B$

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  - $B = 18 + 1$  (AES) takes 870 core-hours<sup>1</sup>
  - $B = 15 + 1$  (best known  $g$ ) takes 20 736 core-hours (quadratic  $\Rightarrow$  81 core-hours)
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## Greedy extension idea (DDT)

Input space:  $(\mathbb{F}_2^n)$

•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
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
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
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- edge  $x_i - x_j$  when

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
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
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
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
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- good *randomization*: large space for initial choices
- almost all our best approximations were found using this algorithm

# Plan

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# Crypto S-boxes

$n$	S-box	$\delta$	Lin	deg	VecLins <sub>5</sub> (Out of 256)
8	$S_{15}$ (APN) <sup>2</sup>	2	32	2	15
	$x^3$ (APN)	2	32	2	16
	AES	4	32	7	18
	Kalyna $\pi_2, \pi_3$	8	48	7	19
	BelT	8	52	7	20
	Kuznyechik	8	56	7	20
	Anubis	8	68	7	21
	Skipjack	12	56	7	21
	Scream	8	64	6	22
	SNOW-3G SQ	8	64	5	26
	iScream	16	64	6	27
	Safer	128	92	7	30
	Skinny <sub>8</sub>	64	128	6	47
CSS	128	256	4	81	

<sup>2</sup>Found in [Beierle and Leander 2022]

# Monomials

	$n$											
$S$	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
$x^3$	6	7	9	11	16	19	25	28	36	39	55	51

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$x^{2^n-2}$	7	7	10	12	18	19	34	30	66	41	130	50

Proposition ([Zhang, Wang, Yu, Guo, and Cui 2023 ASIACRYPT])

For  $n$  even, the finite field inverse map can be linearized on  $\geq 2^{n/2} + 2$  points, based on the decomposition:

$$x^{2^n-2} = (x^{2^{n/2}+1})^{2^{n/2}-2} \cdot x^{2^{n/2}}$$

# Super-Sboxes

$n$	Super-Sbox	Key	VecLin $\geq$
16	Midori64	(0,0,0,0)	4096
	Midori64	(C,C,C,C)	4096
	Midori64	(E,2,1,9)	576
	Midori64	(0,A,0,F)	1280
	SKINNY64	(0,0,0,0)	1054
	SKINNY64	(9,8,2,0)	1046
	LED	(0,0,0,0)	117
	LED	(5,A,5,9)	114
	MISTY-FI	(0,0,0,0)	50
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32	AES	(00,00,00,00)	$60^3$

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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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# Cryptanalysis options




1. Randomize **instance&solution**
2. Randomize **approximation**

# Cryptanalysis options



1. Randomize **instance&solution**
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  - *Partition* when available (deterministic)

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1. Randomize **instance&solution**
2. Randomize **approximation**
  - *Partition* when available (deterministic)
  - *Covering* can be more efficient (probabilistic)!

Our algorithms

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- Probabilistic covering

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# Cryptanalysis tool: probabilistic covering



Approx. Weight Size

Input	Pr[x is covered by]				Pr[cov.]
	$A_1$	$A_2$	$\dots$	$A_5$	

# Cryptanalysis tool: probabilistic covering




Approx.	Weight	Size
---------	--------	------

$A_1$	0.18	115
-------	------	-----

Input	Pr[x is covered by]				Pr[cov.]
	$A_1$	$A_2$	...	$A_5$	
0...00	0.18				0.18
0...01	0.18				0.18
0...10					
⋮					
1...11					


# Cryptanalysis tool: probabilistic covering



Approx.	Weight	Size
$A_1$	0.18	115
$A_2$	0.15	102

Input	Pr[x is covered by]				Pr[cov.]
	$A_1$	$A_2$	...	$A_5$	
0...00	0.18				0.18
0...01	0.18	0.15			0.33
0...10		0.15			0.15
⋮					
1...11		0.15			0.15

# Cryptanalysis tool: probabilistic covering




Approx.	Weight	Size
$A_1$	0.18	115
$A_2$	0.15	102
$A_3$	0.23	120
$A_4$	0.20	99
$A_5$	0.24	109
Avg.		109.56

Input	Pr[x is covered by]				Pr[cov.]
	$A_1$	$A_2$	...	$A_5$	
0...00	0.18			0.24	0.42
0...01	0.18	0.15			0.33
0...10		0.15			0.15
⋮					
1...11		0.15		0.24	0.39

$\rightarrow (\text{avg. } |A_i|) / 2^n$

# Cryptanalysis tool: probabilistic covering




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$A_3$	0.23	120		0.15			0.15
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$\rightarrow (\text{avg. } |A_i|) / 2^n$

- Choose **weights**: maximize  $\text{avg. } |A_i|$  and uniformity (Linear Programming)


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- Effective **approximation size** 109.56 vs naive enumeration  $2^n/5 = 51.2$


# Cryptanalysis tool: probabilistic covering



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
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- Effective **approximation size** 109.56 vs naive enumeration  $2^n/5 = 51.2$
- Imbalance in probabilities can be mitigated by #sboxes
- Quadratic S-boxes: **perfect** covering using derivative shifts!

## Application to CICO problem



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## Application to CICO problem

**Table:** Lower bound  $g_{LB}$  on the approximation size  $g$  needed for linearization attack

**Time complexity:** factor  $t^{-\#\text{sboxes}}$  over exhaustive search, where  $g = t \cdot g_{LB}$

Rounds	$g_{LB}(n)$
1	$2^{n/2} = \sqrt{2^n}$
2	$2^{3n/4}$
3	$2^{5n/6}$
4	$2^{7n/8}$
$R$	$2^{n(1-\frac{1}{2R})}$

## Application to CICO problem

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Rounds	$g_{LB}(n)$	$n = 4$	$n = 8$	$n = 16$	$n = 32$	$n = 64$
1	$2^{n/2}$	4	16	$2^8$	$2^{16}$	$2^{32}$
2	$2^{3n/4}$	8	64	$2^{12}$	$2^{24}$	$2^{48}$
3	$2^{5n/6}$	10.1	102	$2^{13.3}$	$2^{26.7}$	$2^{53.3}$
4	$2^{7n/8}$	11.3	128	$2^{14}$	$2^{28}$	$2^{56}$
$R$	$2^{n(1-\frac{1}{2R})}$					

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**Example:** SKINNY<sub>8</sub> S-box:  $16(R = 1) < g = 47 < 64(R = 2)$

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$R$	$2^{n(1-\frac{1}{2R})}$					

**Example:** SKINNY<sub>8</sub> S-box:  $16(R = 1) < g = 47 < 64(R = 2)$

Experimentally verified:  $2^{15.3}$  complexity on CICO<sub>3,3</sub>(1R) vs  $2^{24}$  exhaustive search

# Plan

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## On linearizations of S-boxes:




- new powerful **algorithms** (heuristic or exhaustive)
- **results** for crypto S-boxes, monomials, SuperSboxes
- **covering** technique and generic **CICO** linearization



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## Open questions

- understanding monomial approximations
- more concrete cryptanalysis ideas

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# Greedy extension algorithm (DDT)

- 1:  $\text{DDT}_{\text{sol}} \leftarrow \{(\delta_x, \delta_y) \mapsto \{x \mid S(x) + S(x + \delta_x) = \delta_y\}\}$
- 2:  $\text{LS}_x = \{0\} \subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$
- 3:  $\text{LS} = \{(0, 0)\} \subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n \times \mathbb{F}_2^m$
- 4:  $\text{cliques} \leftarrow \{\{x\} : x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n\}$
- 5: **for**  $d \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$  **do**
- 6:      $(a, a') \leftarrow$  representatives of two biggest cliques from different cosets ( $(a + a') \notin \text{LS}_x$ )
- 7:      $\delta_x \leftarrow a + a'$
- 8:      $\delta_y \leftarrow S(a) + S(a')$
- 9:     **for all**  $v \in \text{LS}$  **do**
- 10:          $(\tilde{\delta}_x, \tilde{\delta}_y) \leftarrow v + (\delta_x, \delta_y)$
- 11:         **for all**  $x \in \text{DDT}_{\text{sol}}[\tilde{\delta}_x, \tilde{\delta}_y]$  **do**
- 12:             Merge cliques containing  $x$  and  $x + \tilde{\delta}_x$
- 13:         **end for**
- 14:     **end for**
- 15:      $\text{LS} \leftarrow \text{LS} \cup ((\delta_x, \delta_y) + \text{LS})$
- 16:      $\text{LS}_x \leftarrow \text{LS}_x \cup (\delta_x + \text{LS}_x)$
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12:      Merge cliques containing  $x$  and  $x + \tilde{\delta}_x$    using union-find data structure
13:    end for
14:  end for
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- 5: **for**  $d \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$  **do**
- 6:      $(a, a') \leftarrow$  representatives of two biggest cliques from different cosets  $((a + a') \notin \text{LS}_x)$      **using heap**
- 7:      $\delta_x \leftarrow a + a'$
- 8:      $\delta_y \leftarrow S(a) + S(a')$
- 9:     **for all**  $v \in \text{LS}$  **do**      $|\text{LS}| = 1, 2, 4, 8, \dots, 2^d, \dots, 2^{n-1}$
- 10:          $(\tilde{\delta}_x, \tilde{\delta}_y) \leftarrow v + (\delta_x, \delta_y)$
- 11:         **for all**  $x \in \text{DDT}_{\text{sol}}[\tilde{\delta}_x, \tilde{\delta}_y]$  **do**      $\mathcal{O}(1)$  **expected values**
- 12:             Merge cliques containing  $x$  and  $x + \tilde{\delta}_x$      **using union-find data structure**
- 13:         **end for**
- 14:     **end for**
- 15:      $\text{LS} \leftarrow \text{LS} \cup ((\delta_x, \delta_y) + \text{LS})$
- 16:      $\text{LS}_x \leftarrow \text{LS}_x \cup (\delta_x + \text{LS}_x)$
- 17: **end for**
- 18:  $A \leftarrow$  affine map interpolated from the largest clique
- 19: **return**  $A$

# Extension framework (DDT)


domain of  $A$ ,  $\subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$

$x_0$

choose  $x_0$ , set  $A(x_0) = S(x_0)$

# Extension framework (DDT)

domain of  $A$ ,  $\subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$




choose  $x_0$ , set  $A(x_0) = S(x_0)$

choose  $x_1$ , set  $A(x_1) = S(x_1)$

# Extension framework (DDT)

domain of  $A$ ,  $\subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$




choose  $x_0$ , set  $A(x_0) = S(x_0)$

choose  $x_1$ , set  $A(x_1) = S(x_1)$

choose  $x_2$ , set  $A(x_2) = S(x_2)$

# Extension framework (DDT)

domain of  $A$ ,  $\subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$



choose  $x_0$ , set  $A(x_0) = S(x_0)$


choose  $x_1$ , set  $A(x_1) = S(x_1)$

choose  $x_2$ , set  $A(x_2) = S(x_2)$

$$\begin{aligned} A(x_3) &= A(x_0 + x_1 + x_2) \\ &= A(x_0) + A(x_1) + A(x_2) \stackrel{?}{=} S(x_3) \end{aligned}$$

# Extension framework (DDT)

domain of  $A$ ,  $\subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$



choose  $x_0$ , set  $A(x_0) = S(x_0)$

choose  $x_1$ , set  $A(x_1) = S(x_1)$


choose  $x_2$ , set  $A(x_2) = S(x_2)$

$$\begin{aligned} A(x_3) &= A(x_0 + x_1 + x_2) \\ &= A(x_0) + A(x_1) + A(x_2) \stackrel{?}{=} S(x_3) \end{aligned}$$

choose  $x_4$ , set  $A(x_4) = S(x_4)$

# Extension framework (DDT)

domain of  $A$ ,  $\subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$



choose  $x_0$ , set  $A(x_0) = S(x_0)$

choose  $x_1$ , set  $A(x_1) = S(x_1)$

choose  $x_2$ , set  $A(x_2) = S(x_2)$


$$\begin{aligned} A(x_3) &= A(x_0 + x_1 + x_2) \\ &= A(x_0) + A(x_1) + A(x_2) \stackrel{?}{=} S(x_3) \end{aligned}$$

choose  $x_4$ , set  $A(x_4) = S(x_4)$

$$A(x_5) \stackrel{?}{=} S(x_5) \text{ for free}$$

# Extension framework (DDT)

domain of  $A$ ,  $\subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$



choose  $x_0$ , set  $A(x_0) = S(x_0)$

choose  $x_1$ , set  $A(x_1) = S(x_1)$

choose  $x_2$ , set  $A(x_2) = S(x_2)$

$$\begin{aligned} A(x_3) &= A(x_0 + x_1 + x_2) \\ &= A(x_0) + A(x_1) + A(x_2) \stackrel{?}{=} S(x_3) \end{aligned}$$


choose  $x_4$ , set  $A(x_4) = S(x_4)$

$$A(x_5) \stackrel{?}{=} S(x_5) \text{ for free}$$

choose  $x_6$ , set  $A(x_6) = S(x_6)$

# Extension framework (DDT)

domain of  $A$ ,  $\subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$



choose  $x_0$ , set  $A(x_0) = S(x_0)$

choose  $x_1$ , set  $A(x_1) = S(x_1)$

choose  $x_2$ , set  $A(x_2) = S(x_2)$

$$\begin{aligned} A(x_3) &= A(x_0 + x_1 + x_2) \\ &= A(x_0) + A(x_1) + A(x_2) \stackrel{?}{=} S(x_3) \end{aligned}$$

choose  $x_4$ , set  $A(x_4) = S(x_4)$

$$A(x_5) \stackrel{?}{=} S(x_5) \text{ for free}$$

choose  $x_6$ , set  $A(x_6) = S(x_6)$

$$A(x_7) \stackrel{?}{=} S(x_7) \text{ for free}$$

$$A(x_8) \stackrel{?}{=} S(x_8) \text{ for free}$$